[Żarłak]

Taki raport nt. rosyjskich "postępów" modernizacyjnych w siłach zbrojnych FR. W skrócie, plany modernizacyjne, które zakładają, że do 2020 roku 70% sił zbrojnych FR będzie zmodernizowana (aby dorównać do poziomu NATO) są nierealne. Najgorzej jest z flotą bałtycką.

Bardzo interesująca lektura. Można się m.in. dowiedzieć, że około sto tysięcy wojska FR jest związana w zw. z wojną na Ukrainie, więc jakakolwiek próba ataku na inny kraj jest mało realna. Dodatkowo, jak to Rosjanie mają w zwyczaju i co pitbbru potwierdza, szykują się na "atak wrogich sił, by walczyć w kolejnej wojnie ojczyźnianej". Co zabawne, nikt nie wie kto miałby chcieć FR zaatakować, a zapewne największy wróg Rosji siedzi na Kremlu.

3.2.2. Can Russia meet its target for 70% of modern weapons by 2020? The Russi an armed forces have a poor track record of meeting procurement targets (for example, the 1996 - 2005 State Armaments Programme spent only 20% of its initially envisaged budget ), 86 and it remains to be seen whether the current State Armaments Programme will b e different. The above summary show s that all Russian armed forces are making substantial investments in new military hardware. However, at the current rate of progress, these will not be enough to meet the 2020 target.  

Figure 4 shows that in most categories of equipment, deliveries lag behind targets. Admittedly, these figures should be viewed with caution, as some are estimates, and in any case the pace of delivery is likely to step up once new designs are ready.

3.2.3. Reasons for slow progress towards the 70% target

Financing : the share of the defence budget spent on new equipment has increased, from 37% in 2013 to over half this year ; 87 however, until the economy shows sign s of recovery , any further increase , either in equipment expenditure or overall military spending , seems unlikely .

Corruption : even when funding is available, a large part of it is lost to corruption — as much as 40% of the procurement budget, according to a 2012 estimate . 88 Corruption pervades all levels of the armed forces and the defence industry — former Defence Minister Serdyukov is himself facing corruption charges.

Limited production capacity : the defence industry has a poor track record in meeting de livery deadlines — for example, the Vikramaditya aircraft carrier, delivered to India five years late in 2013. It ma y lack the capacity t o produce the amount of equipment envisaged by the 2011 - 2020 State Armaments Programme at the same time as meeting heav y demand from foreign clients (US$1 5 billion in 2014 ). 89

Quality is also an issue . F or example Bulava submarine - launched missiles , which took 18 years to develop, have repeatedly fail ed tests — according to the submarine designer, due to 'poor quality mater ials ... the lack of necessary equipment ... [and] inefficient quality control' . 90

Import restrictions : although most Russian weapons have traditionally come from the domestic defence industry, some have been imported in the absence of satisfactory Russian - produced alternatives, as in the case of the I sraeli drones mentioned above, or Italian armoured vehicles ordered in 2010 . 91 In both these cases , some of the production was based in Russia, enabling acquisition not only of the equipment but also of the underlying technology.

Czyli Rosjanie mają poważne problemy systemowe z wdrożeniem programu. Korupcja rzędu 40%, problemy jakościowe w rozwijanych technologiach, problemy z dostawą, niewystarczające finansowanie czy niewydolne moce produkcyjne.


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